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EXPERT MEDICAL OPINION EVIDENCE
Although Donoho and McCorkle indicate that administration of state law
on military bases does not interfere with federal law, they are limited in that
they involve only state and county governments; not the military. It must be
remembered that no cases exist which directly involve the extent to which a
base commander can regulate children's protective service activity by state
personnel on base. The cases previously alluded to simply state that (before
the enactment of ACAP) where federal funds partially support state child
welfare programs, those states must also provide child welfare services to
children residing on military bases. But, from all indications, it seems that
the carrying out of such programs does not interfere with the military.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that exclusive jurisdiction does not mean absolute jurisdiction in
all areas of law. The subject of child abuse and neglect belongs to the laws
of the states and not to the federal government. However, state administra-
tion of these laws on a military base is subject to regulation by the base
commander, in the interests of discipline and security. Although the extent
to which military restrictions on state authorities on base is not clear, it
seems certain that full proscription of such state activity would not be
supported by a court of law. State social workers have a right and a duty to
provide children's protective services on military bases.
WILLIAM D. ACTON, JR.
Expert Medical Opinion Evidence in North Carolina:
In Search of a Controlling Precedent
I. INTRODUCTION
The common-law system of proof has always been rigid and demanding
in its insistence upon the most reliable source of information in a given case;
particularly when the testimony is that of an expert medical witness.' In
North Carolina, and most other jurisdictions, this policy has resulted in the
gradual development of highly complex evidentiary rules relating to the
admissibility of opinion and hearsay evidence by qualified experts.2 Al-
though his value as an expert3 is desired by the courts because of his superior
I. C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 11013 (2d ed. 1972). (hereinafter cited as MCCOR-
MICK)
2. Id. at §§ 13-15.
3. Qualification as an expert is largely a question of fact and ordinarily within the
exclusive province of the trial judge. Qualifications are not rigid. "It is enough that, through
study or experience, or both, he has acquired such skill that he is better qualified than the jury
to form an opinion on the particular subject." (Citations omitted) I STANSBURY'S NORTH
CAROLINA EVIDENCE 429 (Brandis Revision, 1973). (hereinafter referred to as STANSBURY)
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skill in a particular field, and his ability to form an expert opinion will be
helpful to a jury of laymen, severe restrictions usually have been imposed
upon the nature of the expert's testimony.
To make full use of the possibilities of expert testimony the witness
must be permitted to give his opinion on facts not within his personal
knowledge; but, since it is ultimately the jury's province to find the
facts as well as to draw the necessary inferences therefrom, the facts
upon which he grounds his opinion must be brought before the jury
in accordance with recognized rules of evidence. When these facts
are all within the expert's own knowledge, he may relate them
himself and then give his opinion; or, within the discretion of the
trial judge, he may give his opinion first and leave the facts to be
brought out on cross-examination. When the facts are not within his
knowledge they must, as a general rule, be testified to by other
witnesses and then incorporated, expressly or by reference, in a
hypothetical question addressed to the expert. If he has personal
knowledge of some of the facts but not all, a combination of these
two methods may be employed.' (citations omitted)
What exactly is or is not within the expert medical witness' "personal
knowledge" or "personal observation"? Is the opinion of a medical expert
rendered inadmissible in North Carolina because it is based, wholly or in
part, on the case history of a patient related to the physician for the purpose
of diagnosis or treatment? Is the opinion of a medical expert rendered
inadmissible in North Carolina because it is based, wholly or in part, on
statements made by a third party, rather than by the patient? May the
medical expert testify directly to the results of his examination and his
"opinion" thereon, or must his opinion be elicited by a properly formed
hypothetical question? If the facts assumed in a hypothetical question are
based partially on a medical case history, is the hypothetical insufficient to
form the basis for an admissible opinion?
At the present time there are no definitive answers to these questions and
no clear rules for the guidance of practicing attorneys in North Carolina.
Two recent decisions5 of the North Carolina Supreme Court have been
mutually contradictory-neither expressly nor impliedly overruling prior
precedents. 6 "Since no case has been overruled and no thorough judicial
attempt to reconcile these various decisions has been made, this writer can
only conclude that there is at hand a convenient precedent for the next
decision, whatever its tenor may be." 7
4. Id. at 445-46.
5. State v. Bock, 288 N. C. 145,217 S.E.2d 513 (1975), modified - U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. 3208
(1976) (modified as to the death penalty); State v. DeGregory, 285 N.C. 122, 203 S.E.2d 795
(1974).
6. See STANSBURY at 143 (Supp. 1976).
7. Id.
2
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The exclusionary rules in question rest on the hearsay rule, and excep-
tions thereto, and govern the admission of statements made to physicians;
especially as to the distinction between attending and non-attending physi-
cians. Since the new FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE question the validity of
these distinctions as rules of evidence, 8 and since the North Carolina
Supreme Court has not definitively ruled on the above questions, 9 the time
seems especially appropriate to review the existing rules, to highlight the
conflicts and to stress the urgent need for legislative or judicial resolution of
the dilemma.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULES IN NORTH CAROLINA
A. Penland v. Bird Coal Company
Originally, in North Carolina a physician was excluded from testifying as
to his opinion based upon statements made to him by his patient. 10 Howev-
er, a more liberal rule was adopted in Penland v. Bird Coal Company, I a
workmen's compensation case. In Penland, the plaintiff sought damages for
injuries suffered in a fall while working as a truck driver for the defendant
employer. His evidence showed that he suffered a broken rib and a punc-
tured lung. The plaintiff testified that he was unable to do any heavy work
without extensive pain and that he suffered from fatigue and shortness of
breath. 
2
A medical expert, specializing in surgery, testified that the plaintiff was
referred to him by another physician for treatment of his chest condition. He
further related the case history the plaintiff had given him concerning his on-
the-job injury and indicated that the plaintiff had no history of any other
injuries. From his examination of the plaintiff, the physician testified that
there was a "delay in the quickness of his movements caused by the pain
produced when he moves . . . amounting to . . . a functional disability
. . . of a general nature of 25 per cent." On cross-examination, the
physician testified that "I found no objective symptoms; all findings that I
have are based on subjective statements made by the claimant . . . as a
result of my examination, there was no physical cause of disability, no x-ray
cause of disability-none deemable."' 3
From a finding for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed on the ground that
the physician's opinion as to plaintiff's disability was "incompetent evi-
8. FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, Rules
703, 803 (4), (West 1976). (expert testimony and medical testimony) (hereinafter cited as
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE)
9. See note 6 supra.
10. See STANSBURY at 447. Cf. State v. Alexander, 179 N.C. 759, 103 S.E. 383 (1920).
11. 246 N.C. 26, 97 S.E.2d 432 (1957).
12. Id. at 29, 97 S.E.2d at 434.
13. Id. at 29-30, 97 S.E.2d at 435. It is significant that the expert's opinion in Penland was
not based on objective tests, but rather on personal examination and observation, resulting in a
subjective opinion.
3
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dence in view of the witness' admissions, made on cross-examination, to the
effect that the testimony was based upon 'subjective statements made by the
claimant'." 14 The superior court reversed the award of the Full Commission
and plaintiff appealed.
In finding for the plaintiff, the North Carolina Supreme Court held:
[T]he rule is that ordinarily the opinion of a physician is not rendered
inadmissible by the fact that it is based wholly or in part on state-
ments made by the patient, if those statements are made, as in the
instant case, in the course of professional treatment and with a view
of effecting a cure, or during an examination made for the purpose
of treatment and cure. 'In such cases statements of an injured or
deceased person, while not admissible as evidence of the facts stated,
may be testified to by the physician to show the basis of his opin-
ion.'15 (emphasis added)
It should be noted that, in Penland, the expert medical testimony was not
elicited by an appropriately phrased hypothetical question, based on facts
properly introduced in evidence. 16 Rather, the testimony of the treating
physician as to the patient's statements was held admissible on the ground
that the statements were not presented as substantive evidence (i.e. to prove
the truth of the matter asserted), but only to show the basis of the expert's
opinion. Accordingly, the testimony was not treated as hearsay,' 7 since
testimony is not generally objectionable as hearsay if introduced for any
reason other than to prove the truth of the matter stated. 18 In contrast to the
above rule, Rule 803 (4) of the FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 19 treats such
statements as hearsay, instead of nonhearsay, but allows their admission as
14. Id.
15. Id. at 31, 97 S.E.2d at 436.
16. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
17. "Evidence, oral or written, is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in
whole or in part, upon the competency and credibility of some person other than the witness by
whom it is sought to produce it." Chandler v. Jones, 173 N.C. 427, 92 S.E. 145 (1917).
"[W]henever the assertion of any person, other than that of the witness itself in his present
testimony, is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, the evidence so offered is
hearsay." STANSBURY § 138, at 459-60. "Hearsay evidence is testimony in court, or written
evidence of a statement made out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion to show
the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the
out-of-court asserter." MCCORMICK § 246, at 584.
18. STANSBURY § 141, at 467. See State v. Crump, 277 N.C. 573, 178 S.E.2d 366 (1971);
Highway Comm. v. Conrad, 263 N.C. 394, 139 S.E.2d 553 (1965) (An expert witness may testify
as to the basis of his opinion because it is not offered to show the truth or falsity of such
matters, but how the witness arrived at value. It is therefore not hearsay evidence.) Gonzales v.
Hodsdon 420 P.2d 813 (Idaho 1966) ("In such an instance the patient's statements are not
regarded as hearsay: the statements are introduced without regard for the truthfulness of the
fact stated, but merely as observed facts forming part of the physician's data.") 420 P.2d at 816.
Contra. Schears v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 355 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. 1962); Reid v. Yellow Cab Co.,
131 Ore. 27, 279 P. 635 (1929); Paulk v. Thomas, 115 Ga. App. 436, 154 S.E.2d 872 (1%7).
19. "Statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing
medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general
character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment." (emphasis added)
4
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an exception to the hearsay rule. Furthermore, Rule 703 allows the opinion
testimony of experts to be based on facts or data which need not be
admissible in evidence (e.g oral hearsay).2" The reason for enactment of
these more liberal federal rules will be discussed in greater detail later in this
comment. For the present, it should be noted that the judicial rule stated in
Penland was favorably received in North Carolina, 21 particularly since it
freed "litigants, courts and juries from the mazes and misuses of the
hypothetical question."
22
B. Todd v. Watts
In Todd v. Watts,23 however, the court apparently reversed itself. Justice
Sharp, speaking for the majority, held that allowing a physician to express
an opinion based on matters beyond his personal knowledge and not proper-
ly grounded upon a hypothetical question was error. 24 In Todd, plaintiff
sought damages for injuries allegedly suffered in an automobile accident.
Her evidence tended to show that during the collision she had been thrown
forward, striking her head on the windshield and her knees on the dash-
board, while wrenching her back. An orthopedic physician who had treated
the plaintiff testified as an expert witness on her behalf. He first related the
history of her complaints, including a congenital spinal defect, as told to
him by the plaintiff on her first visit to the physician for treatment. This
testimony also included references to the recent accident and a recitation of
how her injuries were caused. There was no objection to this testimony
although, on request of defense counsel, its use was limited to corroborating
the testimony previously given by the plaintiff. 25 The doctor was then asked,
over objection, to give his diagnosis from his examination, and his opinion
based on the statements of the patient and his subsequent examination (not
in response to a hypothetical questions), as to the permanency and cause of
the plaintiff's injuries. 26 The jury awarded damages to the plaintiff.
20. "The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon
the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence." (emphasis added) See
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 803 (Hearsay Exceptions: Availability of Declarant Im-
material) and commentary thereto; FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 703 (Bases of Opinion
Testimony By Experts) and commentary thereto.
21. See Brandis, Evidence, Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 45 N. C. L. REV. 934
(1967).
22. Note, Evidence-Expert Testimony-Physician's Opinion Based on Patient's State-
ments, 46 N. C. L. REV. 960, 964-965 (1968).
23. 269 N.C. 417, 152 S.E.2d 448 (1967).
24. Id. at 421, 152 S.E.2d at 451.
25. Id. at 422, 152 S.E.2d at 451. As several writers noted, this seemed consistent with
North Carolina's liberal use of the "corroboration rule" which allows testimony otherwise
excluded as hearsay. See STANSBURY § 136, N. 71, at 447; note 22 supra, n. 3, at 960-61.
26. Id. at 419-20, 152 S.E.2d at 450-51.
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The North Carolina Supreme Court awarded a new trial, solely because of
error in admitting the expert medical testimony. The majority regarded the
testimony of the expert as incompetent in view of his admission, on cross-
examination, to the effect that his testimony was based entirely upon the
subjective statements of the plaintiff.27
Since it is the jury's province to find the facts, the data upon which
an expert witness bases his opinion must be presented to the jury in
accordance with established rules of evidence. 'It is well settled in
the law of evidence that a physician or surgeon may express his
opinion as to the cause of the physical condition of a person if his
opinion is based either upon facts within his personal knowledge, or
upon an assumed state of facts supported by evidence and recited in
a hypothetical question.' A witness is not permitted to base his
opinion upon facts of which he has no knowledge.2 1 (citations
omitted)
In a strong and well-reasoned dissent, Parker, C. J., quoted the Penland
rule as controlling and consistent with the general rule that: "In such cases
statements of an injured or diseased person, while not admissible as evi-
dence of the facts stated, may be testified by the physician to show the basis
of his opinion." 29 (citations omitted) In conclusion, the Chief Justice stated:
To hold, as the majority opinion does, that Dr. Piggott's diagnosis
and opinion are inadmissible in evidence because based in part on
statements given to him in 1963 by plaintiff when she was examined
by him for the purpose of rendering to her medical assistance, is
unpractical, because a doctor customarily relies upon such state-
ments made to him by a patient in the practice of his profession, and
such a holding defies the usual processes of medical thought.3" (em-
phasis added)
The exact intent of the majority in Todd with regard to overruling or
limiting the rule in Penland remained speculative, because Penland was
completely ignored in the majority opinion. 31
C. State v. DeGregory
Whereas the majority in Todd ignored Penland, and the more liberal rule
stated therein, in the more recent case of State v. DeGregory32 a unanimous
court resurrected Penland and ignored Todd.
27. Id. at 421, 152 S.E.2d at 451.
28. Id. at 420, 152 S.E.2d at 451.
29. Id. at 422, 152 S.E.2d at 452.
30. Id. See STANSBURY § 136, n. 71, at 447; note 22 supra. Although the Chief Justice urged
a continuation of the more liberal Penland rule, he still distinguished the testimony of a treating
physician from that of an examining physician (for the purpose of testimony at trial).
31. See STANSBURY § 136, at 447. Professor Brandis, in referring to the decision in Todd v.
Watts stated: "But the latest decision seems unfortunately, to revert to the former rule, though
it may not be wholly definitive." Id.
32. 285 N.C. 122, 203 S.E.2d 794 (1974).
6
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In DeGregory, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder. The
defendant was confined to a state mental hospital for a period of approxi-
mately two months for psychiatric evaluation to determine his capacity to
stand trial.33 Subsequently, at trial, the defendant entered pleas of not guilty
and not guilty by reason of insanity.
34
The evidence for the state tended to show that the defendant DeGregory, a
resident of Florida, shot and killed the victims when he was their house
guest in Charlotte, North Carolina.
35
The defendant, testifying as a witness in his own behalf, stated that he
was staying with the Powells on the date of their deaths. He further testified
that he remembered Mrs. Powell coming home at approximately 9:30 P.M.
on that day. He stated that he remembered having the murder weapon in his
possession at that time. Finally, he testified that he remembered "being in
the bedroom changing clothes . . . [and] Mrs. Powell coming into the
bedroom, kissing him in an improper way and talking to him . ... "36 He
could recall no other events concerning the murders in question. 37
The defendant further testified that "on several occasions, after argu-
ments with his wife, he would have lapses of memory and labor under the
delusion that he had a twin brother named Michael."- 38 A lay witness
testified to the fact that the "defendant thinks he has a twin brother named
Michael; that Michael hated sex and was an avenger; and that defendant was
convinced to a certainty that Michael, in fact, did exist." 39 It was his
opinion that the defendant did not have the capacity to distinguish between
right and wrong at the time of the murders. 40
A clinical psychologist, Dr. Ann McMillan, interviewed and examined
the defendant in Florida, shortly after his arrest. She testified as an expert
witness for the defense. She testified that she conducted thirty hours of
examination and testing on the defendant, including the taking of statements
from the defendant concerning his background and medical history. 4' On
direct examination, not in response to a hypothetical question, and without
objection, Dr. McMillan testified that she had found the defendant to be
mentally ill, suffering from schizophrenia with paranoid tendencies. It was
her professional opinion that the defendant did not have the legal capacity to
33. Id. at 128, 203 S.E.2d at 799.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 123-26, 203 S.E.2d at 795-97.
36. Id. at 126, 203 S.E.2d at 797-98.
37. Id.
38. 285 N.C. at 127, 203 S.E.2d at 798.
39. Id. at 128, 203 S.E.2d at 799.
40. Id.
41. Id. Dr. McMillan related the medical history in detail, without objection, to the court.
Record at 94-95, State v. DeGregory, 285 N.C. 122, 203 S.E.2d 794 (1974).
7
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know right from wrong at the time of the murders.42
As part of the state's rebuttal evidence, Dr. Robert Rollins testified as a
medical expert specializing in psychiatry.43 He testified that, while the
defendant was at Dorothea Dix Hospital for psychiatric evaluation to deter-
mine his capacity to stand trial," he was under Dr. Rollins' direction and
control. He also indicated that he had with him the official hospital records
concerning the defendant. The records had not, however, been entered in
evidence. Dr. Rollins was asked to relhte what the official records showed
concerning the defendant.45
42. 285 N.C. at 128, 203 S.E.2d at 799.
It is my professional opinion that Karl was legally insane at the time I worked with him. In
my opinion, Karl did not have the capacity to know right from wrong on March 2, 1972. 1
think Karl, having a history of going into the fugue or amok stages, he would not have
known what he was doing-and probably would not have remembered afterward because
more commonly than not there is complete amnesia after an act of this nature. Record at
95-96.
43. Id. Dr. Rollins was Superintendent of Dorothea Dix Hospital in Raleigh, North Caroli-
na, with extensive training and experience in psychiatry and psychiatric examination of crimin-
al defendants. At the time of his testimony he had been at Dorothea Dix Hospital for over six
years. Record at 102-03.
44. Id. The fact that Dr. Rollins examined the defendant for the then stated purpose of
determining his mental capacity to stand trial and later testified concerning the defendant's
mental condition at the time of the crime (in rebuttal to the affirmative defense of insanity
raised at trial) would appear to raise a serious constitutional question-as to the defendant's
fifth amendment rights. However, the courts have generally refused to accept this constitution-
al argument, so long as the defendant is represented by counsel. In essence, the competency
question has not been distinguished from the question of criminal responsibility. These two
separate legal issues have been confused and merged by the courts. See A. STONE, MENTAL
HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 179-217 (DHEW Pub. No. ADM 76-176, 1975); R.
PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW 850-88 (2d ed. 1969).
Questions concerning the relevancy of Dr. Rollins' testimony, as to the defendant's mental
condition at the time of the crime, would also appear to be appropriate. However, the authority
in North Carolina seems to be contrary and such testimony is considered relevant and compe-
tent. See generally STANSBURY §§ 70, 77, 90, 97.
At the federal level, the questionable result (from the defendant's viewpoint) of merging and
confusing the legal issues of competency to stand trial and criminal responsibility at the time of
the crime (as to the insanity defense) would appear to be precluded by the precise language of
the statute-at least where no prior notice is given the defendant of the dual function of the
examination.
No statement made by the accused in the course of any examination into his sanity or
mental competency provided for by this section, whether the examination shall be with or
without the consent of the accused, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on
the issue of guilt in any criminal proceeding. A finding by the judge that the accused is
mentally competent to stand trial shall in no way prejudice the accused in a plea of insanity
as a defense to the crime charged; such finding shall not be introduced in evidence on that
issue nor otherwise be brought to the notice of the jury. 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970). See
United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3rd Cir. 1975), United States v. Driscoll, 399 F.2d
135 (2nd Cir. 1968), Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398 (U.S. App. D.C. 1955). But see
United States v. McCracken, 488 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1974), United States v. Mattson, 469
F.2d 1234 (9th Cir.) cert. denied 410 U.S. 986 (1972), United States v. Jacquillon (5th Cir.),
469 F.2d 380, cert. denied 410 U.S. 938 (1972), United States v. Julian, 469 F.2d 371 (10th
Cir. 1972), Ashton v. United States, 324 F.2d 399 (U.S. App. D.C. 1963). See also United
States v. Barrera, 486 F.2d 333 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied 416 U.S. 940 (1973).
Unfortunately, the competency provisions of the recently enacted North Carolina Criminal
Procedure Act contain no such saving language. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1002 (1975).
45. 285 N.C. at 128, 203 S.E.2d at 799. In response to a defense question asking whether his
testimony would be predicated on the results of the tests themselves, Dr. Rollins replied: "It
8
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Over objection by the defense, the direct examination of the witness was
continued and the state proffered the following question, which was clearly
not in hypothetical form: "Based upon your own personal examination and
interview of Karl DeGregory, and any other information contained in his
official record of which you were the custodian and had available to you,
did you make a diagnosis of the defendant?" 4 6
Once again, over objection by defense counsel to the second part of the
question, Dr. Rollins testified that:
Based upon my examination, I am of the opinion that Mr. DeGreg-
ory is not47 a paranoid schizophrenic. I have some general knowl-
edge of the circumstances surrounding the crime with which Karl
DeGregory is charged. . .Personally, I spent three hours with Karl
DeGregory. My testimony is predicated on the three hours which I
spent with Karl DeGregory and upon information furnished me by
members of my staff. . .[I] was not treating Mr. DeGregory. I was
just diagnosing .. .I am satisfied that Karl DeGregory was not48
criminally insane based upon my three hours with him. . .As stated
in my report, I said 'No psychiatrist can express a conclusive opin-
ion about the mental responsibility of an individual at a particular
time49 unless he had examined the individual on or about that time;
even then his opinion is only that, an opinion."'5 (emphasis added)
In concluding his testimony, Dr. Rollins discussed the nature of a psychi-
atric evaluation. 51 The witness was excused. After being properly charged,
the jury returned a verdict of murder in the first degree in both cases and the
defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment on each indictment. 52
would be my discussions with people who did various tests in terms of what I thought we ought
to look for and my discussions with them as to what the tests showed." Record at 104.
46. 285 N.C. at 131, 203 S.E.2d at 800.
47. At this point in his testimony, Dr. Rollins uses the present tense, apparently referring to
the defendant's present mental capacity to stand trial.
48. At this point in his testimony, Dr. Rollins changed to the past tense, apparently
referring to the defendant's mental capacity at the time he examined him.
49. At this point in his testimony, Dr. Rollins appears to have impliedly referred to the
defendant's mental state at the time of the actual crime.
50. 285 N.C. at 131, 203 S.E.2d at 800-01. Record at 106-107.
51. Evaluation is not based on specifically what the patient says but the totality of the
relationship between the client and the examiner. If the patient had told me about other
times of disassociation and if I believed what he had told me about the other times of
disassociation, I would have been more likely to reconsider the present incident an episode
of disassociative reaction. Record at 108. (emphasis added).
At this point in his testimony it is clear that Dr. Rollins' testimony refers to the state of mind
of the defendant at the time of the crime and not to the defendant's capacity to stand trial, for
which Dr. Rollins had originally examined him.
52. 285 N.C. at 129, 203 S.E.2d at 799. It is interesting to note that, after the prosecution
witness' extensive testimony as to the psychiatric examination and diagnosis, with the resultant
conclusion that the witness was without psychosis; and the jury's finding of a verdict of murder
in the first degree, that the court, after pronouncing sentence, went on to recommend:
It appearing to the court from the evidence in this case that the defendant is in need of
psychiatric examination and evaluation, it is the recommendation of the court that he be
given a complete psychiatric examination and evaluation as soon after his commitment as
9
Metzger: Expert Medical Opinion Evidence in North Carolina: In Search of a
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1977
276 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
On appeal, counsel for the defense argued that inclusion of the testimony
of Dr. Rollins, based on the second part of the state's question (information
based on the official record, which was not in evidence) was reversible
error. The defense relied on the courts' holding in State v. David.53
In affirming the judgment of the lower court and holding the testimony of
Dr. Rollins admissible, Justice Huskins, speaking for a unanimous court,
stated:
Defendant's interpretation of the quotation from State v. David,
supra, is too limited. The quotation states that an expert may base
his testimony on facts within his personal knowledge or observation,
or may base his opinion on facts presented in a hypothetical ques-
tion, but it does not purport to limit facts and information within the
personal knowledge of an expert to knowledge derived solely from
matters personally observed. As demonstrated in opinions of this
court since State v. David, supra, an expert witness has wide latitude
in gathering information and may base his opinion on evidence not
otherwise admissible.54 (emphasis added)
Completely ignoring the more recent decision in Todd, and failing to
consider or distinguish the fact that Dr. Rollins' testimony was based on an
examination and evaluation for the purpose of diagnosis and eventual
testimony at a criminal prosecution (not treatment), the court resurrected the
rule in Penland.
In Penland v. Coal Co., 246 N.C. 26 ,97 S.E.2d 432 (1957), the
testimony of a physician was challenged because his opinion was
based on statements made to him by the patient during the course of
a professional examination. We noted that although the statements
of the injured patient were 'not admissible as evidence of the facts
stated, [they could] be testified to by the physician to show the basis
of his opinion' and held that it is permissible for a physician to base
his opinion, wholly or in part on such statements, if made by the
possible and that he be accorded such treatment and care thereafter as this examination
may indicate to be necessary and desirable. Record at 5.
Although it is far beyond the scope of this comment, Professor Abraham S. Goldstein's brilliant
and definitive work on the complexities and hazards of the insanity defense is considered both
pertinent (as to expert testimony) and independently worthy of serious study by a criminal trial
attorney. See A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967).
53. 222 N.C. 242, 22 S.E.2d 633 (1942). "There are two avenues through which expert
opinion evidence may be presented to the jury: (a) Through testimony of the witness based on
his own personal knowledge or observation; and (b) Through testimony of the witness based on
a hypothetical question addressed to him in which the pertinent facts are assumed to be true, or
rather, assumed to be so found by the jury." 222 N.C. at 254, 22 S.E.2d at 640. See STANSBURY
at 446. The defense argued:
The question posed to Dr. Rollins complies with neither requirement of the foregoing cited
authority. Furthermore, Dr. Rollins was asked, in effect, to base his opinion, in part, on
records which were never before the Court. The defendant contends this error is prejudi-
cial as it related to his insanity defense. The Court, in overruling this objection, allowed
Dr. Rollins to render an expert opinion based on information obtained by some one else,
which informationwas inadmissible in evidence. Brief for Appellant at 14-15.
54. 295 N.C. at 132, 203 S.E.2d at 801.
10
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 [1977], Art. 7
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol8/iss2/7
EXPERT MEDICAL OPINION EVIDENCE
patient in the course of professional treatment, or during the course
of an examination made for the purposes of treatment and cure.55
(emphasis added)
After reiterating the far more liberal Penland rule, the court went on to
quote from Highway Commission v. Conrad56 (another precedent which
antedated Todd), which referred to the testimony of an expert witness
retained only for the purpose of trial, and quoted a rule even more liberal in
scope.
The fact that certain elements are not independently admissible in
evidence . . . does not bar their consideration by an expert witness
in reaching an opinion. Thus, it has been said: 'An integral part of an
expert's work is to obtain all possible information, data, detail, and
material which will aid him at arriving at an opinion. Much of the
source material will be in and of itself inadmissible evidence but this
fact does not preclude him from using it in arriving at an opinion, All
of the factors he has gained are weighed and given the sanction of his
experience in his expressing an opinion. It is proper for the expert
when called as a witness to detail the facts upon which his conclu-
sion or opinion is based and this is true even though his opinion is
based entirely on knowledge gained from inadmissible sources.'
(People v. Ganghi Corp., Cal. App., 15 Cal. Rptr. [19] 25).
The court went on to cite Potts v. Howser,5 8 a decision handed down after
Todd. In Potts, the court held that the medical expert's testimony was
admissible, even though it was based partly on a radiologist's report and
accompanying x-rays, which were used by him to diagnose the plaintiff's
injuries, but which were not introduced into evidence.
Finally, the court relied on numerous federal decisions to support its
holding in the instant case. 59 In particular, they relied upon Birdsell for the
rule that the testimony of a psychiatrist based upon a personal interview and
an examination of a defendant's case history, tests and hospital records, not
in evidence, was admissible "if the expert rendering it is made available for
cross-examination."' In DeGregory, the court concluded that:
On these authorities, and on reason as well, we hold that it was
proper for Dr. Rollins to base his expert opinion as to the sanity of
Karl DeGregory upon both his own personal examination and other
information contained in the patient's official hospital record. The
question was proper and the answer was competent.6' (emphasis
added)
55. Id.
56. 263 N.C. 394, 139 S.E.2d at 553 (1965).
57. Id. at 399, 139 S.E.2d at 447. Accord. State v. Arnold, 218 Or. 43, 341 P.2d 1089 (1959).
58. 274 N.C. 49, 161 S.E.2d 737 (1968).
59. United States v. Davila-Nater, 474 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1973); Birdsell v. United States,
346 F.2d 775 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 963 (1965). (and cases cited therein)
60. 285 N.C. at 133-34, 203 S.E.2d at 802.
61. Id. In his analysis of the DeGregory decision, Professor Brandis noted:
The opinion seemed to proceed on the assumption that the hospital record would not have
277
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.The court in DeGregory did go on to note that even if Dr. Rollins could
not base his opinion on inadmissible evidence, that
[H]is testimony discloses that his opinion of defendant's sanity is
based strictly on his own personal observation of defendant. At one
point Dr. Rollins said: 'Based upon my own examination I am of the
opinion that Mr. DeGregory is not a paranoid schizophrenic.' Later
on cross-examination, he made the following statement: 'I am satis-
fied that Karl DeGregory was not criminally insane based upon my
three hours with him.' Although Dr. Rollins did at one point in his
testimony state that his testimony was based on both his personal
interview with Karl DeGregory and information furnished by his
staff, it is clear that on the crucial question of Karl DeGregory's
sanity, he based his testimony solely on his personal observation of
defendant. It thus appears that defendant has not been prejudiced by
the doctor's testimony even under the more restrictive view of the
law urged by defendant.62 (emphasis added)
D. State v. Bock
A little over a year after the court's holding in DeGregory, the North
Carolina Supreme Court handed down its most recent decision concerning
the critical evidentiary rules in question. In State v. Bock,6 3 a trial situation
almost identical with that of DeGregory, expert medical opinion testimony,
by an examining (not treating) physician, was held inadmissible because it
was based on matter beyond the expert's personal knowledge and not
grounded upon a proper hypothetical question.
64
In Bock, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder. 65 In an
effort to establish the fact that the defendant was legally unconscious at the
time of the alleged murder and consequently unable to form the requisite
been independently admissible as a business record (see § 155). STANSBURY at 143 (Supp.
1976). (emphasis added)
62. 285 N.C. at 134, 203 S.E.2d at 802-03. Commenting on this portion of the opinion,
Professor Brandis stated:
(The Court also held that the critical part of the opinion of the witness was based solely
upon his personal observations; but the devotion of one paragraph to this and nine to the
other ground of decision rather indicates that the latter was not judicially conceived to be
dictum.) STANSBURY at 143 (Supp. 1976).
63. 288 N.C. 145, 217 S.E.2d 513 (1975), modified - U.S. -, 96 S.Ct. 3208 (1976).
64. Id. at 162, 217 S.E.2d at 524.
65. Id. at 147, 217 S.E.2d at 515. Testifying in his own defense, the defendant stated that on
the day in question he had a friend purchase two fifths of Bacardi Rum. Bock testified that he
consumed between one and two fifths during the subsequent twelve hour period. Bock testified
further that he recalled having intercourse with the victim on the night in question, that they
argued and fought about money and, as he was getting into her car, she came at him with his
knife. He remembered grabbing her arm, but did not recall what happened thereafter. Bock
stated that he did not recollect stabbing the victim or running over her. (The victim was killed by
one of the 55 stab wounds inflicted upon her body by a sheath knife belonging to the defendant
and subsequently her body was run over by her own car, driven by the defendant.) He indicated
that he had only a fragmentary recollection of his return to the party and events prior to his
arrest the following morning. Record at 58-70. State v. Bock, 288 N.C. 145, 217 S.E.2d 513
(1975), modified - U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. 3208 (1976).
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specific intent for first-degree murder, 66 the defense called Dr. Charles E.
Smith as an expert witness. 67 Dr. Smith, a forensic psychiatrist, testified he
had observed and examined the defendant for a period of over two hours,
two days prior to the term of court, for the purpose of giving testimony at
trial .68 After this brief direct examination, defense counsel posed a hy-
pothetical question for the witness.
69
In the presence of the jury, the witness further indicated that since the
examination in question he had also personally interviewed members of
Bock's family and friends (third parties) concerning the defendant's past
history, development, and mental state.70
66. Ordinarily unconsciousness or automatism is a complete, not a partial defense to a
criminal charge. State v. Mercer, 275 N.C. 108, 165 S.E.2d 328 (1969). Cf. 21 Am. Jur. 2d
Criminal Law § 29 (1965). Voluntary intoxication which results in unconsciousness, however,
cannot lead to a complete acquittal. See Annot. 8 A.L.R.2d 1231 (1963). (Modern Status of the
Rules as to Voluntary Intoxication as Defense to a Criminal Charge) See also Bratty v. A.-G.
for N. Ireland, 3 A.E.R. 523 (1961). However, in North Carolina, when a defendant charged
with first-degree murder is utterly unable to form the requisite specific intent, due to voluntary
intoxication, the grade of the offense is reduced to second-degree. State v. Bunn, 283 N.C. 444,
196 S.E.2d 777 (1973). (emphasis added)
67. Dr. Smith testified that he was a Professor of Psychiatry at the University of North
Carolina Medical School and Director, Mental Health Services, North Carolina Department of
Correction. He further testified that he had previously served as Medical Director and Chief
Psychiatrist for the Federal Bureau of Prisons; that he had devoted some 25 years to the work
of examining criminal defendants in various aspects of trial proceedings and that during the
previous five years he had examined approximately 2,000 persons who were committed to the
Department of Correction for diagnostic study. Record at 76. See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 148-12
(1975).
68. 288 N.C. at 153, 217 S.E.2d at 518. Dr. Smith testified further that his examination
included questions concerning both the defendant's past history and the allegations in the
instant case. Record at 77.
69. 1 will ask you, based upon your experience and training and your observation and
examination of Robert Gary Bock, and in addition that if the jury should find as a fact in
this case that Robert Gary Bock, Jr. met with a girl known as 'Candy' on the 22nd day of
November, 1973, and if the jury should find further that they had never met on a prior
occasion; that on the date that they met, he went with her in her automobile, with him
driving; that he was under the influence of some intoxicating beverage; that he had not
eaten during that day; that he had had approximately four to five hours sleep during that
day; that he and the girl attended a gathering for a brief time at the home of one Martin
Bergman; that they left the gathering together, and after again having sexual intercourse
they mutually engaged in a heated argument, the subject of which was the payment of
money by Robert Gary Bock to the girl; that during and in the course of that argument
Bock struck her with his fist and knocked her down; that she then got up and advanced
upon him with an open knife, and that Bock seized the arm holding the knife; and if the
jury should find further as a fact that thereafter Karen Wilkes Stewart died as a result of
multiple stab wounds inflicted upon that occasion and that Robert Gary Bock inflicted
them, do you have an opinion satisfactory to yourself as to whether or not Robert Gary
Bock could have been not conscious of what was transpiring at the time he inflicted all or
any of those wounds? Record at 77-78.
Although this hypothetical appears to be properly formed and based on testimony properly in
evidence, the state's objection to the hypothetical question was sustained. However, in the
absence of the jury, Dr. Smith replied: "I am unable to form an opinion on that question."
Record at 78.
It should be noted that Dr.Smith's inability to form an opinion was not based on the
inadequacy of the hypothetical, but rather on the complexity of the hypothetical question. See
note 71, infra.
70. 288 N.C. at 153. 217 S.E.2d at 518. Counsel for the defense then asked Dr. Smith the
following: "Would you describe your examination, please, for the Court with reference to
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On voir dire, in the absence of the jury, Dr. Smith testified for the record
only concerning the results of his examination and observations. He noted
that the defendant had a significant history of drinking to excess and that, in
the past, on several occasions during his drinking spells he had experienced
blackout spells, lapses of memory or amnesia. As to his mental condition,
the witness found the defendant to be "insecure, inadequate and a chronical-
ly anxious person who is very prone to rebel and to make angry." 7 1 At this
point the jury returned and defense counsel posed the following hypothetical
question:
these-." The state's objection to testimony involving statements made by someone other than
the defendant was sustained.
Counsel for the defense then asked the witness: "As to statements made by the defendant in
your clinical analysis of him, would you describe that examination?" The state's objection to
the question was sustained.
Counsel for the defense then asked Dr. Smith: "Will you tell the court results of your
examination?" The objection was sustained and the jury excused. Record at 79. Note the strong
similarity between this series of questions and those asked of Dr. Rollins in DeGregory.
71. 288 N.C. at 153, 217 S.E.2d at 518-19. Further attempts by defense counsel to elicit the
witness' expert medical opinion, based on hypothetical questions or the examination alone,
were objected to by the state and sustained by the court. Record at 80-85.
At one point the following exchange took place between defense counsel and Dr. Smith:
[Q.] Based on your examination alone, if he has testified that he does not recall what
occurred after a point at which a girl was advancing on him with a knife until the occasion
when he was driving an automobile, do you have an opinion satisfactory to yourself as to
whether or not he could in fact be unable to recall that period of time?
A. Yes, I do have an opinion on that. I think I have stated that he probably would not
have a true recall of the totality of the events.
Q. What is the basis of your opinion that he probably does not recall that period of time?
A. My opinion derives from my examination of him, my efforts to develop from him
what happened, my independent efforts. (emphasis added)
Q. And that is all?
A. Yes. My impressions are reinforced by what I viewed today in the courtroom but I
came here persuaded that he could not recall this.
Q. Are the additional facts he has testified he does not recall such as to keep you from
being able to form an opinion that you would otherwise be able to form?
A. No. I simply prefer to limit my answer to my examination. As far as the hypothetical
you have laid out, the question is too complex for me to understand and be responsive to. I
would have to study that question before I could respond to it. Record at 83. (emphasis
added)
None of the above testimony was held to be admissible in open court and it was accepted for
the record only. However, the opinion of Dr. Smith, who had some 25 years of experience as a
medical expert witness at trial proceedings, concerning the complexity of the hypothetical
question, is worthy of special notice. Dr. Smith is not alone in his criticism of the hypothetical
question. The hypothetical question has been consistently criticized by legal scholars. See
STANSBURY § 137; MCCORMICK § 16. Professor Wigmore stated in no uncertain terms his
conclusion that "[i]ts abuses have become so obstructive and nauseous that no remedy short of
extirpation will suffice. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 686 (3d ed. 1940). For a landmark decision
on the hazardous hypothetical, see Rabata v. Dohner, 45 Wis.2d 111, 172 N.W.2d 409 (1969).
Equally worthy of note, in highlighting the confusion which currently exists concerning the
admissibility of expert medical opinion, is the following exchange, which took place between
defense counsel, Dr. Smith and the prosecutor-in the presence of the judge:
Q. I am not able to have you testify what he told you during the examination, but I can
have you testify what he told the jury. (emphasis added)
A. I don't see why I can't testify to what a man tells me in the course of an examination.
That is not hearsay. (emphasis added)
[Prosecutor]: It is hearsay. The only way you can repeat what he said to you would be for
corroboration. Record at 85. (emphasis added)
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Q. Dr. Smith, based upon your examination and observation of
Robert Gary Bock, Jr., and further if the jury should find as a fact
that at some time in the early morning of the 23rd of November, an
altercation arose between Robert Gary Bock, Jr. and an individual
identified as Candy, and that sometime after that altercation Robert
Gary Bock, Jr. was driving an automobile down a dirt road, do you
have an opinion satisfactory to yourself as to whether or not Robert
Gary Bock, Jr. could in fact be unable to recall that interval between
those two incidents?
7 2
The state's objection to the hypothetical question was sustained and Dr.
Smith was precluded from answering, except for the record. Had he been
allowed to answer, the witness would have testified:
It is my opinion that during the period between the onset of this
altercation and the last stated event in the hypothetical question the
defendant entered into a state of pathological intoxication73 in which
his consciousness was clouded to the extent that he probably in fact
does not have complete recall for the events encompassed within
this time span.74 (emphasis added)
The witness was excused. At the close of all the evidence the defense
renewed its motion for a nonsuit, specifically moving for nonsuit as to the
charge of first-degree murder. The motion was denied. A jury instruction
submitted to the court by the defense, on self-defense, was denied. An
instruction proffered by the defendant as to the defense of unconsciousness
was allowed.7 5 The jury returned a verdict of guilty to the charge of murder
in the first degree and the defendant was sentenced to death.7 6
72. 288 N.C. at 154, 217 S.E.2d at 519.
73. Pathological intoxication as a criminal defense, or as related to "partial responsibility",
is in a state of conflict today. See Lewin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Cases For Purposes
Other Than The Defense of Insanity, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1051 (1975); comment, Intoxication
As A Criminal Defense, 55 COLUM L. REV. 1210 (1955). For a recent North Carolina case
discussing the defense, see State v. Baldwin, 276 N.C. 690, 174 S.E.2d 526 (1970).
74. 288 N.C. at 154, 217 S.E.2d at 519. On cross-examination of the witness, the following
exchange took place between the prosecutor and Dr. Smith:
[Prosecutor]: I would ask you, Doctor, if you saw the defendant on only one occasion?
A. Yes, that is correct.Q. And whatever opinions you might have about the defendant or his past-would those
opinions be based on whatever he may have said to you?
A. Yes, counselor, it is substantially based upon my examination of him. (emphasis
added)Q. And whatever he may have said?
A. Based upon my examination of him and we did converse during the examination.
Record at 86. (emphasis added)
Again, note the similarity of the responses on cross-examination here to those on cross-
examination of Dr. Rollins in the DeGregory case.
75. 288 N.C. at 154, 217 S.E.2d at 519. After the jury had retired to consider its verdict, and
it had been out for three minutes, the prosecutor requested that the judge instruct the jury
concerning a possible finding that if the defendant, as a result of his intoxication, was unable to
form a specific intent, he could not be found guilty of first-degree murder. The jury was so
instructed and again retired to find its verdict. Record at 110.
76. 288 N.C. at 154, 217 S.E.2d at 519.
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On appeal, counsel for the defense argued that exclusion of Dr. Smith's
testimony was reversible error. 77 In affirming the judgment of the lower
court, and holding the testimony of Dr. Smith inadmissible, Sharp, C. J.,
speaking for a unanimous court, cited Todd as controlling. The court held
that "the facts assumed in the hypothetical question were obviously insuffi-
cient to enable Dr. Smith to form a satisfactory opinion." 78 Referring to
STANSBURY § 137 (form of the hypothetical question), the court stated:
Patently, the doctor's opinion was based upon evidence which was
not included in the question, as well as upon facts which were not in
evidence at all. The latter was the defendant's history of excessive
drinking followed by blackout spells or periods of amnesia, which
the doctor obtained from the defendant, his family and friends.
However, neither defendant himself nor anyone else testified that he
had such a history. Obviously, therefore, Dr. Smith's opinion was
based in major part upon hearsay evidence.79
Citing Cogdill v. Highway Commission, 80 the court also noted that:
Where an expert witness testifies as to facts based upon his personal
knowledge, he may testify directly as to his opinion. Generally,
77. Id. at 161-62, 217 S.E.2d at 523. He argued that Dr. Smith's testimony as to his
psychiatric examination served as a basis for his clinical opinion as to the defendant's mental
state and was nonhearsay. Referring to STANSBURY § 136, the appellant did not cite DeGregory,
but referred to the decisions in both Penland and Todd. DeGregory, however, has been cited as
controlling in State v. Wright, 29 N.C. App. 752, 225 S.E.2d 645 (1976). The appellant
distinguished Todd on the ground that:
[T]he objectionable feature there was that the facts of the automobile accident (analagous
here to the facts of the killing) were not submitted hypothetically, subject to jury accept-
ance of testimony already offered. Read as a whole, the case cannot be said to exclude
medical findings as a partial basis for opinion, even though these findings result from
numerous factors, some of which may be statements made to others. Stated more simply,
it is one thing to exclude testimony of an expert about the very event which is the subject
of the trial when he has no firsthand knowledge of the event, yet quite another thing to
exclude evidence of medical findings . . .No useful purpose is served and the law does
not require the blind application of the hearsay rules to testimony which relates only to
medical findings. Brief for the Appellant at 28, State v. Bock, 288 N.C. 145, 217 S.E.2d
513 (1975), modified - U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. 3208 (1976).
On appeal, the state also failed to cite DeGregory, but did cite STANSBURY § 136, Penland,
and Todd. The state, however, relied on the rule in Todd concerning an expert opinion being
grounded upon the patient's statements to the witness, and concluded that since Dr. Smith only
talked to the defendant for two hours he necessarily relied upon the defendant's statements and
version of what happened on the night of the murder. In concluding its argument, the state
relied on the Penland distinction between a physician who examines a patient for treatment and
cure and one who examines a patient for no other purpose than trial-contending that Dr.
Smith's testimony was properly excluded for that reason. Brief for the State at 25, State v.
Bock, 288 N.C. 145, 217 S.E.2d 513 (1975), modified - U.S. -, 96 S.Ct. 3208 (1976). Note,
however, that the total time of examination by Dr. Rollins in DeGregory was only a matter of
minutes longer than the total examination time of Dr. Smith in Bock. Furthermore, it should be
noted that, in DeGregory, Dr. Rollins also examined the defendant for no other purpose than
for trial.
78. 288 N.C. at 162, 217 S.E.2d at 524.
79. Id.
80. 279 N.C. 313, 182 S.E.2d 373 (1971). (nonjury inverse condemnation proceeding against
the Highway Commission)
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however, an expert witness cannot base his opinion on hearsay
evidence. And when the facts are not within the knowledge of the
witness himself, the opinion of an expert must be upon facts sup-
ported by the evidence, stated in a proper hypothetical question."'
The court went on to state the rule in Penland (for the distinction between
the opinion of a treating physician and the opinion of a physician examining
a patient for the purpose of trial only) and concluded that:
In such a situation it is reasonable to assume that the information
which the patient gives the doctor will be the truth, for self-interest
requires it. Here, however, Dr. Smith did not examine the defendant
for the purpose of treating him as a patient, but for the purpose of
testifying as a witness for defendant in this case in which he is
charged with first-degree murder. The motive which ordinarily
prompts a patient to tell his physician the truth is absent here. The
evidence was therefore incompetent and properly excluded. 2
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT
The conflict in precedents, as regards the admission of expert medical
opinion in North Carolina, is obvious from a close examination of the
records and opinions in Penland, Todd, DeGregory and Bock. Professor
Brandis, in his analysis of the court's decision in State v. Bock, succinctly
encapsulates the conflict and underlines the dilemma faced by North Caroli-
na criminal trial attorneys in search of a guiding precedent.
As indicated in the original note, the majority in Todd v. Watts
ignored Penland. Reciprocally, in DeGregory, a unanimous Court
resurrected Penland and ignored Todd. Subsequently, in State v.
Bock, supra note 64, the Court cited with approval both Todd (for
the proposition that the facts assumed in a hypothetical were insuffi-
cient to form the basis for a satisfactory opinion) and Penland (for
the proposition that a treating physician may express an opinion
based wholly or in part on statements made to him by the patient).
The latter proposition is obviously more stringent than the rule
applied to the prosecution expert in DeGregory, which, in its turn,
was ignored in Bock. The Court in Bock sustained exclusion of the
opinion of a defense psychiatrist (not engaged in treatment) as to the
probability that defendant did not have complete recall of events,
since the opinion was based upon evidence not included in the
hypothetical question, and also upon facts, not in evidence at all,
reflected in statements to the witness by defendant's family and
friends, as well as by defendant. In other words, the opinion 'was
based in major part upon hearsay evidence'. Since no case has been
overruled and no thorough judicial attempt to reconcile these vari-
ous decisions has been made, this writer can only conclude that
81. 288 N.C. at 162, 217 S.E.2d at 524.
82. Id.
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there is at hand a convenient precedent for the next decision, what-
ever its tenor may be.83
In Penland the court apparently adopted as a controlling precedent, the
more modern rule reflected in several other jurisdictions. 84 This rule allows
the opinion of an expert, based on facts not in evidence, to be admitted-not
as substantive evidence, but only to show the basis of the expert's opinion.
The court retained, however, the traditional distinction between a treating
and examining physician.
85
In Todd, without overruling, distinguishing or limiting its prior decision
in Penland-indeed, without even mentioning this essentially correlative
holding-the court returned to the traditional rules. 86 It is possible to
distinguish Todd from Penland on the ground that in Penland the expert
related his opinion as to the past symptoms of the plaintiff, whereas in Todd
the opinion could arguably be said to have been based on the patients'
statements of the external cause. 87 However, if this was the distinction that
the court used, "it seems overly technical . . . since it seems highly
improbable that the jury failed to comprehend that the opinion testimony as
to cause implicitly assumed that plaintiff was involved in the collision (not
in dispute) ... "88 It is possible also that the court in Todd was reacting
to the manner of the statement of opinion by the expert (i.e. as a fact). The
court may have relied on the rule that expert opinion as to cause invades the
province of the jury, if it is stated as a certainty and not in the more
constrained "could" or "might" terminology.8 9 However, if this was the
rationale behind the decision in Todd, it is certainly inconsistent with the
holding in DeGregory, where the expert's opinion was obviously stated as a
fact.9° It would, however, be consistent with the expert's opinion in Bock, 9
which the court might have considered to be in the objectionable terms of
certainty. Nevertheless, it seems highly unlikely that the jury considered the
expert's response in Bock as fact rather than opinion. Further, such a fine
line of distinction can hardly be justified as a rule of exclusion for testimony
which can mean the difference between life and death for the defendant.
83. STANSBURY at 143 (Supp. 1976).
84. Gentry v. Watkins-Carolina Trucking Co., 249 S.C. 316, 154 S.E.2d 112 (1967); Danner
v. Chandler, 205 Okla. 185, 236 P.2d 503 (1951); Groat v. Walkup Drayage & Warehouse Co., 14
Cal. App. 2d 530, 580 P.2d 200 (1936); Poropat v. Olympic Peninsula Motor Coach Co., 163
Wash. 78, 299 P. 979 (1931); Acme Cement Plaster Co. v. Westman, 20 Wyo. 143, 122 P. 89
(1912).
85. See STANSBURY § 136.
86. Todd v. Watts, 269 N. C. 417, 152 S.E.2d 448 (1967).
87. See STANSBURY § 136; Comment, Evidence-Expert Testimony-Physician's Opinion
Based on Patient's Statements, 46 N.C.L. REV. 960 (1968)
88. Brandis, Evidence, Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 45 N.C.L. REV. 934, 950. See
the authorities cited in the Chief Justice's quotation from Penland, in his dissent in Todd. Todd
v. Watts, 269 N.C. 417, 422, 152 S.E.2d 448, 452 (1967).
89. See STANSBURY § 137.
90. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
91. See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
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In DeGregory, the court apparently readopted as a controlling precedent
the more modern rule of Penland (while ignoring its decision in Todd) and,
at the same time, appeared to abandon the questionable distinction between
the treating and examining physician. 92 Read as a whole, the opinion relied
heavily on federal decisions93 and appeared to reflect almost total. adoption
of the rationale behind the FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE. 94 In the Advisory
Committee's Note on Rule 703, the committee indicated that inadmissible
facts or data upon which an expert can base his opinion may be derived from
three possible sources-first hand observation, a hypothetical question or
data obtained by the expert out of court and other than by his own percep-
tion. 95
In this respect the rule is designed to broaden the basis for expert
opinions beyond that current in many jurisdictions and to bring the
judicial practice into line with the practice of experts themselves
when not in court. Thus a physician in his own practice bases his
diagnosis on information from numerous sources and of con-
siderable variety, including statements by patients and relatives,
reports and opinions from nurses, technicians and other doctors,
hospital records, and x-rays. Most of them are admissible in evi-
dence, but only with the expenditure of substantial time in producing
and examining various authenticating witnesses. The physician
makes life-and-death decisions in reliance upon them. His valida-
tion, expertly performed and subject to cross-examination, ought to
suffice for judicial purposes.' (emphasis added)
The above rationale is apparent throughout most of the opinion in De-
Gregory. Further, the court even appears to sanction opinion testimony as to
an ultimate issue (sanity). 97 Certainly the viability of the use of cross-
examination, 98 to provide the requisite circumstantial guarantees of necessi-
92. See STANSBURY § 136. The FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 803 (4), treats state-
ments made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment as an exception to the hearsay rule
"insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment." Id. at 103.
In the Advisory Committee's Note, it is concluded that:
Conventional doctrine has excluded from the hearsay exception, as not within its guaran-
tee of truthfulness, statements to a physician consulted only for the purpose of enabling
him to testify. While these statements were not admissible as substantive evidence, the
expert was allowed to state the basis of his opinion, including statements of this kind. The
distinction thus called for was one unlikely to be made by juries. The rule accordingly
rejects the limitation. This position is consistent with the provision of Rule 703 that the
facts on which expert testimony is based need not be admissible in evidence if of a kind
ordinarily relied upon by experts in the field. Id. at 110.
93. See note 59, supra.
94. See notes 19-22 supra.
95. FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE at 81. The rules thereby eliminate the problematical
hairline distinction as to when the expert is relying on personal observation and when he is
relying on the patient's statements as a basis for his opinion.
96. Id. at 81-82. See Rheingold, The Basis of Medical Testimony, 15 VAND. L. REV. 473
(1961).
97. See FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 704.
98. Id. Rule 705.
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ty and trustworthiness, is demonstrated in DeGregory-but, it is also
demonstrated in Penland, Todd, and Bock.
Only at the conclusion of its opinion, and in apparent dictum, 99 does the
court backslide toward the "personal observation" distinction.' 00 Certainly
this latter distinction falls in the face of the court's decision in Bock; but
DeGregory was ignored in the Bock opinion. Accordingly, the only poss-
ible factual distinction between DeGregory and Bock appears to be the
length of the examinations (three hours in the former case compared to over
two hours in the latter) and a contradictory, if not totally irreconcilable
conclusion regarding "personal observation". The only other possible dis-
tinction between the two decisions is the type of other information partially
relied upon by the expert as a basis for his opinion-in Bock, the medical
history taken personally by the expert from the defendant and his relatives
(at most, oral hearsay) and in DeGregory, the medical record (at most,
double hearsay). Clearly the latter distinction would, if valid, favor the
inclusion of the testimony in Bock, rather than the testimony in DeGregory.
IV. CONCLUSION
The chaos and confusion surrounding this area of evidentiary law in North
Carolina clearly militates toward the necessity for immediate legislative or
judicial resolution of this conflict. As a minimum, there must be judicial
reconciliation of the various conflicting decisions. However, it is suggested,
in view of the complexity of the existing rules, and the apparent irreconcil-
able differences inherent in these decisions, that the North Carolina Legisla-
ture should take early action to adopt the clear, consistent and modern
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE.
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration,
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of
growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined. FEDER-
AL RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 102. (emphasis added)
Clearly the same rationale which supports the FEDERAL RULES OF EvI-
DENCE justifies the adoption in North Carolina of evidentiary rules which
acknowledge that a competent expert's reliance on an item of information in
forming his opinion may provide an indication of that information's reliabil-
ity. l 1 The legislature should ensure the courts recognize the ability of a
competent expert to evaluate information that he receives from others. His
general experience, coupled with his investigation into the particular case,
presumably gives him sufficient background to question someone effective-
99. See STANSBURY at 143 (Supp. 1976).
100. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
101. Indeed, perhaps the best method of ensuring uniform application of evidentiary rules
by the courts, in every case, is through the adoption by the legislature of uniform rules of
evidence, using the FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE as a model.
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ly on the crucial facts and to properly evaluate the answers. Further, if the
adversary doubts the reliability of the answers and desires to challenge the
expert's opinion because of the hearsay element it is partially based upon,
then he has ample opportunity to cross-examine the expert to determine the
care and competence which the expert exercised in his examination or
interview and his reasons for relying on the information obtained.
It appears that legal experts refuse to recognize similar expert ability in
physicians.
Yet all of the scientific disciplines, including medicine, rest primarily
on a foundation of training to establish those facts relevant to the
scientific practice that they involve. Thus, a doctor bases his diag-
nosis of a case first on his general expertise as a physician, including
his education in medical school, his internship at a hospital, his
continued readings in medical treatises and journals, information
gleaned in conversations with other physicians, and practical experi-
ence gained as a practitioner. Most of these sources are hearsay, and
the validity of the small amount of information that is not based on
hearsay-the physician's personal observations-depends on the
physician's ability to compare the observations to his past learning.
A physician can competently base his opinion on hearsay sources
because his mastery of the scientific information allows him to
assess the hearsay's validity. That is, in fact, the very basis of his
qualification as an expert.
When the physician turns to a particular case he may also receive
information from many sources in addition to his own examination.
The patient may describe both his present and past symptoms and
the manner in which the disease or injury occurred. Similarly, the
patient's relatives, friends, other doctors, nurses, medical techni-
cians, laboratory tests, and x-rays may convey information to the
physician. Although the doctor receives all this information, he may
not rely on all of it because his medical expertise will direct him to the
information that relates to his diagnosis and will provide a frame of
reference against which to check that data's reliability. Thus, the
physician's general background becomes a part of the diagnosis of a
particular case and vests it with nearly the same degree of reliability
as other observations comprising his general experience.
The physician's expertise and his method of diagnosis provide
some circumstantial guarantees that the information on which he
actually relies in reaching an opinion will be reliable. When the
physician testifies, cross-examination can further test the accuracy
of that information by establishing his opportunity to evaluate the
particular hearsay statement in question and ascertaining whether he
in fact subjected the information to critical evaluation. 2 (emphasis
added)
102. Comment, The Physician's Testimony-Hearsay Evidence or Expert Opinion: A Ques-
tion of Professional Competence, 53 TEX. L. REV. 296, 316-317 (1975).
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In the final analysis, the primary concern must be for early action by at
least one of our coordinate branches of government-the legislature or the
judiciary. Without a governing statute or clearly controlling precedent, the
practicing attorney may well find himself in the somewhat uncommon, and
certainly undesirable, position of the defense counsel in Bock. 0 3 Further,
with the probable enactment of a constitutional death penalty in North
Carolina °4 in the near future, the need for early legislative or judicial action
can hardly be minimized.'o
Pending legislative or judicial resolution of the conflict, attorneys would
be well advised to follow the traditional rules of introducing evidence, as
enunciated in Todd.106 Caution should dictate a careful review of the case
with the expert witness prior to trial. 0 7 Finally, at trial, all necessary
103. In the alternative, appellant contends that if the testimony of Dr. Smith was properly
excluded, but could have been introduced if presented in another manner, then that
testimony was of such value and relevance to his defense that failure to properly introduce
it amounts to incompetence of counsel. The testimony of Dr. Smith contained matters
which the jury should have heard in order to fully and fairly consider the issues at trial.
Either the Trial Court erred, or defense counsel did. It is respectfully submitted that, in
either event, a new trial is required. Brief for Appellant at 28-29.
104. Durham Morning Herald, Jan. 13, 1977, at 1, Col. 3. Surely a legislature which
adopts a constitutional death penalty has a clear mandate to ensure the courts which apply
such a penalty are guided by clear, consistent and just rules of evidence.
105. NOW, THEREFORE, in compliance with the law, the judgment of the court
pronounced upon Robert Gary Bock, Jr., is:
That the defendant, Robert Gary Bock, Jr., be taken hence by Charles G. Wimberly, High
Sheriff of Moore County, North Carolina, and by him delivered into the custody of the
warden of the State Prison of North Carolina in the City of Raleigh, North Carolina, to be
by said warden safely detained until Friday, the 5th day of April, Nineteen Hundred and
Seventy-four, the said warden of the State Prison of North Carolina or, in the case of his
death, inability, or absence, a deputy warden of said institution shall, between the hours of
ten o'clock A.M. and four o'clock P.M., convey the said Robert Gary Bock, Jr., to the
place prepared for execution, and then and there upon the day designated, the 5th day of
April, Nineteen Hundred and Seventy-four, between the hours fixed on said day, cause
the said Robert Bock, Jr. to inhale lethal gas of sufficient quantity to cause death, and the
administration of said lethal gas must be continued until the said Robert Gary Bock, Jr. is
dead.
AND MAY GOD HAVE MERCY ON HIS SOUL.
Record at 4-5, State v. Bock, 288 N.C. 145, 217 S.E.2d 513 (1975), modified -U.S. -, 96
S.Ct. 3208 (1976).
106. This is particularly true in view of the motion practice recently adopted in the NORTH
CAROLINA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-959 (1975). Section 959 of this
Act requires notice of the defense of insanity. Further, the Official Commentary to that section
states:
This section covers two overlapping situations. The first relates to an intention to raise the
defense of insanity. The second relates to an intention to introduce expert testimony
relating to mental disease, defect, or other mental state. A defendant intending to raise the
defense of insanity would always wish to come forward with his own expert; however,
there may be a number of situations where the defense of insanity itself is not technically
raised but expert testimony as to mental state will be introduced to negative the defendant's
culpability with respect to some element of the offense. This section would require notice in
either situation. The defendant must give the notices required in this section, whether a
demand is made by the solicitor or not. Id. (emphasis added)
107. See Wecht, The Medical Witness-What Are The Attorney's Responsibilities, 10
FORUM 377 (1974-75). With these essential pretrial conferences, the possibility that an
expert medical witness will be unable to form an opinion, due to the complexity of a
hypothetical question, becomes rather remote.
22
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 [1977], Art. 7
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol8/iss2/7
"QUICK-TAKE" CONDEMNATION
evidence should be meticulously introduced and carefully incorporated into
a properly framed hypothetical question, designed to elicit carefully phrased
opinions from witnesses.
JOHN M. METZGER
North Carolina Eminent Domain-Consitutional
Challenges to Chapter 506 of the North Carolina Session
Laws of 1967: "Quicktake" Condemnation
INTRODUCTION
The eminent domain law of North Carolina is a complex and often
confusing collection of statutes that have been enacted one on top of another
with little, if any, consideration for the impact on the existing body of law.'
This oft-cited critical pronouncement of North Carolina Eminent Domain
law sets the stage for the analysis contained herein.
The present array of "granting law," authorizes more than seventy
condemnors to condemn property, and the composite of "procedural law"
includes over eighteen separate procedures for effectuating the grant of
condemnation authority. Condemnees, attorneys and even judges, often-
times evince uncertainty and confusion both about the nature of the authority
and the scope of the application of procedures used in exercise of the
authority. Pronouncements of the North Carolina Supreme Court may apply
to one procedure but not to another, thus inevitable confusion results when
courts must interpret different procedures. In turn, the landowner must
prepare to defend, if necessary, against the taking of his property amongst a
myriad of procedures-some affording greater protection of the owner's
property interests than others.
Inherent in the condemnation process is the conflict between the protec-
tion of the owner's property rights and the public's need for administrative
convenience and expedience. Thus, the proliferation of different procedures
is largely a reflection of dissimilar judgments as to what is more important in
a specific type of condemnation, 2 protection of personal property or ad-
ministrative expedience. When the totality of circumstances indicates that a
particular procedure reflects administrative convenience as the prevailing
1. Phay, The Eminent Domain Procedure of North Carolina: The Need For Legislative
Action, 45 N.C.L. REV. 587 (1967).
2. Id. at 589.
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